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Introduction
It is not often that a judgment contains a reference to Aris-
totle’s work or a coda at its conclusion. The recent Singa-
pore Court of Appeal1 judgment of Gay Choon Ing v Loh
Sze Ti Terence Peter2 (delivered by Andrew Phang JA) con-
tained both, the latter of which an extensive judicial expo-
sition on the difficulties (and tentative solutions) relating to
the contractual doctrine of consideration. This re-evalua-
tion of consideration at the slightest opportunity is unsur-
prising, given the conceptual problems that have afflicted
the doctrine. There have been various judicial solutions,
generally capable of classification into two distinct types:
first, through an internal re-definition of concepts within
consideration (for example, the equation of factual and
legal benefit or detriment in Williams v Roffey Bros &
Nicholls (Constructors) Ltd3); second, through the applica-
tion of an external doctrine in conjunction with or in
replacement of consideration (for example, the arguable
substitution of promissory estoppel for consideration in
Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd4). For convenience,
the former type will be termed the ‘internal solution’, and
the latter termed the ‘external solution’. The application of
either type of solution has different implications about the
continued utility of consideration. Whilst leaving its final
conclusion deliberately undecided, the Court in Gay
Choon Ing seemingly preferred an external solution, pro-
viding yet another string to the bow for the abolition of
consideration in contract law, at least in the Singapore con-
text. However, questions remain as to the consequences of
such abolition, particularly when, as this comment will sug-
gest, there is insufficient recognition of the distinction
between (and consequences of) internal and external solu-
tions to the considerable problems of consideration.
Facts and the Court’s re-evaluation of consideration
Despite the Court’s extensive discussion of consideration,
the actual application of the doctrine raised no ‘fundamen-
tal difficulties’.5 The facts that allowed the opportunity to
re-evaluate consideration reflected the ebb and flow of
friendship, captured by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics
(Book VIII),6 and interestingly cited by the Court in a rare
judicial nod to classical literature.7 The appellant in Gay
Choon Ing was a close friend of the respondent and was
employed by the latter’s company in Kenya, ASP, until his
resignation in 2004. In 1993, the appellant’s family business
in Singapore had plans to redevelop a hotel and the appel-
lant sought the respondent’s financial assistance. The
respondent acceded to this request and entered into a trust
deed wherein the appellant was to hold some shares in his
family business on trust for the respondent in exchange for
funds. This investment remained uneventful until 2002,
when the respondent suspected that he was not informed
whenever dividends were declared. The respondent’s suspi-
cion was confirmed in 2003 when the appellant indicated
his desire to leave ASP with an appropriate severance pack-
age, thereby straining the parties’ friendship. Following a
consensus to resolve matters amicably, the parties conclud-
ed a ‘Points of Agreement’ in 2004 wherein the appellant
agreed to purchase the shares held on trust for a sum of
money. At the same time, a waiver letter from ASP was sent
to the appellant, stating that ASP had no claim against the
appellant and that the appellant could leave ASP but with-
out any severance pay. The appellant signed this letter in
acceptance of its terms. However, following another alter-
cation in 2005, the respondent initiated a claim for breach
of trust and an account of all sums due to him. At first
instance, the Singapore High Court found for the respon-
dent and ordered that the ‘Points of Agreement’ be rescind-
ed and that the appellant account for dividends payable to
the respondent. However, the appellant was not found to
be in breach of trust. Both parties later cross-appealed.
The Court allowed the appellant’s appeal. It thought
that the central issue was in contract law (as opposed to
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trust law), viz, whether the contemporaneous execution of
the ‘Points of Agreement’ and the waiver letter constituted
a valid compromise agreement between the parties, there-
by releasing both parties from their obligations to each
other.8 The actual resolution of this issue on the require-
ment of consideration was not difficult: relying on the clas-
sical definition of consideration in Misa v Currie,9 the
Court found that it was sufficient for the respondent to
have suffered a detriment through his promise to relinquish
all claims against ASP, such that it did not matter that ASP
or the respondent may not have been conferred a benefit.
In any event, the Court was prepared to find the confer-
ment of a benefit on the respondent in view of his person-
al interest in not having his company sued. It was also irrel-
evant that ASP (and not the respondent in his personal
capacity) signed the waiver letter because the appellant had
done likewise at the respondent’s request.10 Having found
the other essential elements of a compromise present, the
Court had no difficulty ruling in favour of the respondent. 
While this uncontroversial application of the present
law is unproblematic, it may be questioned whether the
two documents were ever intended to constituted a com-
promise between the parties. There is of course nothing to
prevent the essence of a compromise to be found within
two or more documents, but the Court evidently took a
pragmatic view of the facts in finding that the parties
intended to form a compromise by these two documents.
Indeed, it was prepared to look over the fact that both the
‘Points of Agreement’ and the waiver letter technically
involved different parties, preferring instead to view both
parties in their ‘relevant context’.11 Although, as the Court
correctly stated, this would have no legal effect vis-à-vis the
consideration issue, one may have cause to wonder if the
parties themselves saw the two documents as a valid com-
promise, particularly when, as the Court pointed out on
numerous occasions, the parties’ counsel never made com-
promise a major issue either in proceedings below.12
However, it is probably the case that the conclusion,
on an objective construction of the documents concerned,
was the correct one. What might be legally interesting,
however, is that notwithstanding the rudimentary applica-
tion of consideration, the Court proceeded to discuss the
principal difficulties of the doctrine, as well as the main
alternatives available for future determination. Pursuant to
this endeavour, the Court stated the Williams innovation
generated ‘very practical difficulties’ in as much as it ren-
dered consideration largely redundant since it would be all
too easy to locate some element of consideration between
contracting parties.13 Furthermore, the Williams innova-
tion only had a narrow sphere of operation involving a
promise to pay more for the performance of an existing
duty owed to the same party; it had no application where
the promise is to pay less in discharge of an entire debt (for
example, in Foakes v Beer14). Neither did the innovation
have any relevance in a promise to perform an existing
duty imposed by law (for example, in Glasbrook Brothers,
Limited v Glamorgan County Council15) nor in a promise
to perform an existing duty owed to a third party (for
example, in New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Sat-
terthwaite & Co Ltd16). Indeed, both of these situations are
conventionally explained by the orthodox requirement of
a legal benefit or detriment. Having implicitly considered
that the internal reformation of consideration by the
Williams innovation to be unsatisfactory, the Court indi-
cated a tentative (if rather obvious) preference for the
external application of economic duress as a replacement
for consideration, noting that the situations in Glasbrook
and The Eurymedon may be adequately dealt with by eco-
nomic duress.17 It stopped short of crystallising this prefer-
ence into law because, quite apart from the fact that this
issue was not argued, economic duress (and its related
doctrines of unconscionability and undue influence) is not
free from difficulties.18 Nonetheless, the Court staunchly
noted that consideration would need to be reformed; in
the Court’s own words (at [117]): 
‘However, because the doctrine of consideration does
contain certain basic weaknesses which have been pointed
out, in extenso, in the relevant legal literature, it almost
certainly needs to be reformed. The basic difficulties and
alternatives have been set out briefly above but will need
to be considered in much greater detail when the issue
next comes squarely before this court. One major difficul-
ty lies in the fact that a legal mechanism must be main-
tained that will enable the courts to effectively and practi-
cally ascertain which promises ought to be enforceable.’
Indeed, it seems that the time that the Court has ear-
marked to do so is when a viable alternative relatively
free of problems is found.
Two innovations in the potential future reform 
of consideration
The supposed need to reform consideration is not new,
and has in fact been advocated by many.19 In this
respect, the Court’s unusual coda contains two innova-
tions, one general and the other specific, which may be
of interest in any discussion relating to the potential
reform of consideration.
General innovation: methodology of reform
The general innovation is in the Court’s methodology of
dealing with any future reform to consideration. In seem-
ingly rejecting an internal solution (ie, the Williams inno-
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vation) and preferring an external solution (ie, arguably
economic duress), the Court has avoided (or will avoid on
a future occasion) the present difficulties associated with
internal and external solutions operating in tandem. In this
respect, while the Williams innovation has been widely
praised,20 it has not escaped criticism.21 In particular, it has
been said that the Williams innovation is difficult to recon-
cile with prior case law and that its application renders con-
sideration moot, at least in existing duty cases.22 The prob-
lem might be that, even though the Williams innovation is
an internal solution, it has the potential to fundamentally
alter the orthodox basis of consideration, such that legally
gratuitous promises may be enforceable.23 In this sense, it
assumes the character of an external solution, but without
providing for an alternative doctrine in replacement of
consideration. What remains is in name consideration, and
sought to be conceptually understood as such, but that con-
ceptual understanding cannot be complete, for ‘considera-
tion’ as a label does not accurately describe consideration
anymore. It may be said that the Williams innovation does
not apply in every aspect of consideration (as indeed the
Court does24), but that is to expose the doctrinal incoher-
ence that exists and the inadequacy of the internal solu-
tion.25 Indeed, the Court’s apparent disavowal of the inno-
vation in Williams as reducing the legal requirement of
consideration to almost vanishing point shows a preference
for doctrinal coherence than individual pragmatism.
More broadly, the problem with an internal solution
supplemented by an external one is that both sets of solu-
tions might pull in different directions: whilst internal solu-
tions seek to preserve consideration, external ones arguably
do the exact opposite. Consequently, consideration now
consists of a patchwork of internal solutions supplemented
by partial external ones, leading to the perception that the
doctrine is being preserved in name only but devoid of any
substantive utility. As mentioned above, the lack of unifor-
mity in the application of the internal solutions also leads to
the concern that consideration is internally incoherent.
What is needed is a definitive preference for one category of
solution over the other. The courts could recognise that
whilst consideration fulfils some important function, its
internal rules have become overly technical in apparent sep-
aration from this function, such that it should be wholly
replaced by an external doctrine that is itself not as clouded
internally as consideration is perceived to be. This was what
the Court tentatively settled upon in Gay Choon Ing.
Specific innovation: economic duress as replacement
for consideration?
However, the difficulty of replacing consideration with
another doctrine externally is locating such an alterna-
tive. Any such replacement is necessarily premised on
two bases: first, that the rationale for consideration is
fully understood, and second, that the alternative doc-
trine is capable of giving effect to this rationale.26 If this
is correct, the Court’s specific innovation of an apparent
preference for economic duress in replacement of con-
sideration may not be altogether desirable. In the first
place, while the modern view is that consideration is to
put some legal limits on the enforceability of agree-
ments,27 it is less clear exactly why (and, consequently,
how) consideration is to do this.28 On the one hand, one
could take a broad policy-oriented view and say that cer-
tain agreements should not be enforceable because of
certain extenuating reasons, including duress. On the
other hand, one could also take a narrower view, includ-
ing that which states that the law should only enforce
reciprocal bargains or that consideration may be evi-
dence of a serious intention to contract.29 All of these
have been cited as possible justifications for considera-
tion.30 However, whichever view one takes from the
palette of various justifications for consideration, it is
perhaps clear that no one has been determinatively
accepted as being correct. That makes the search for a
replacement, premised on an understanding of the pur-
pose of the original doctrine being replaced, difficult to
begin. It is of course acknowledged that most of the
abovementioned possible functions of consideration can
be served by other legal doctrines,31 but the mere repli-
cation of its functions in other doctrines is not reason
enough for its abolition; there are numerous examples
of such overlap across contract law.32
In any event, it is certainly the case that the rationale
of consideration is not perfectly symmetrical with (and
hence replaceable by) economic duress specifically. An
examination of the Glasbrook and Eurymedon situa-
tions, which the Court suggested might show the viabil-
ity of replacing consideration with economic duress,33
illustrates the point. Although Glasbrook was concerned
with the public policy of avoiding extortion by public
authorities, the factual scenario therein is not wholly
representative of cases falling within the category of the
performance of an existing duty imposed by law. In par-
ticular, where there is no extortion, there yet may be a
wider public policy not to find consideration so as to
prevent conduct that is generally criminal, as illustrated
in Brown v Brine.34 The fluidity of consideration in
enforcing a wider public policy apart from extortion
also finds expression in a separate set of cases involving
promises to pay rewards for information that might lead
to the arrest of a felon. These promises were enforced
even though in England there was a public duty until
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1968 to do so.35 Here, the public policy is satisfied in the
enforcement of the promise (as opposed to denial), sug-
gesting that the prevention of extortion through eco-
nomic duress is not the full extent of public interests
protected. Likewise, while the situation in The
Eurymedon is susceptible to extortion,36 this does not
necessarily mean that consideration does not perform a
residual function towards deciding whether promises in
that situation should be enforced. Indeed, outside of
modification of contracts, consideration may serve a
wider purpose of sieving out unenforceable promises for
want of economic duress but which were not seriously
intended.37 Without symmetry both in purpose and con-
ceptual basis,38 economic duress may not be a complete
external replacement for consideration. At the very
least, it cannot be the sole replacement of a doctrine that
arguably is ‘a proxy for a number of different reasons
why a promise is not enforceable’.39
Conclusion: compromise is best for now
Ultimately, the problem is that any external solution
requires the rationale of consideration to be authorita-
tively determined to allow for the effective evaluation of
any alternative. The Court’s tentative preference for
economic duress as an alternative (if correctly under-
stood to be such), together with its rejection of econom-
ic duress because it is internally problematic, perhaps
does not recognise this more fundamental problem. To
be fair, the Court has indicated that its views in Gay
Choon Ing were merely tentative, and so its apparent
preference for economic duress as a replacement for
consideration cannot be taken as having conclusively
addressed these problems. However, perhaps the sug-
gestions herein could be useful on the next occasion
when the reform of consideration comes squarely with-
in the Court’s purview. Until then, possibly the best solu-
tion is as the Court in Gay Choon Ing (and most other
jurisdictions in the Commonwealth) settled upon: a
compromise on an imperfect quilt of consideration,
comprising of both internal and external solutions. Per-
haps this is best put by the Court itself, as follows:40
‘In the circumstances, maintenance of the status quo
(viz, the availability of both (a somewhat dilute) doctrine
of consideration as well as the alternative doctrines can-
vassed above) may well be the most practical solution
inasmuch as it will afford the courts a range of legal
options to achieve a just and fair result in the case con-
cerned. However, problems of theoretical coherence
may remain and are certainly intellectually challenging
(as the many perceptive pieces and even books and
monographs clearly demonstrate). Nevertheless, given
the long pedigree of the doctrine, the fact that no single
doctrine is wholly devoid of difficulties, and (more
importantly) the need for a legal mechanism to ascertain
which promises the courts will enforce, the “theoretical
untidiness” may well be acceptable in the light of the
existing practical advantages ...’
This has the attraction of a known imperfection,
which in turn results in certainty: the problems associat-
ed with consideration are well known, and the piece-
meal solutions both internal and external are applied
with little real problems.41 However, whilst certainty is
an important (some may say overriding) consideration
in commercial dealings, the price for it may be one that
the Court is unwilling to pay, judging by its reference to
‘problems of theoretical coherence’42 within considera-
tion. If that is so, then the unusual coda by the Court
will provide interesting judicial fodder for those (in Sin-
gapore at least) who might be looking to the external
extinguishment of consideration, as opposed to the
internal resolution of the doctrine. Perhaps when the
Court does have the direct opportunity to decide more
fully whether to do so, a coda may not be necessary.
However, another quote from Aristotle may not be
entirely out of place, viz. ‘Even when laws have been
written down, they ought not always to remain unal-
tered’.43 The same, with some alteration to take into its
proper context, could be said about consideration,
which, for the moment at least, remains mired in com-
promise in Singapore (and elsewhere).
  
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